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I. INTRODUCTION
Nanotechnology is emerging as a tool that will increasingly change the
way that scientists approach the world. While a subject matter or a mode of
inquiry defines traditional scientific fields, an inquiry of a microscopic level
advancement defines nanotechnology.1 Because of this broad definition,
nanotechnology encompasses a wide array of technologies that exist at that
scale.2 Advances in nanoparticles and nanorobotics are already altering
conceptions of surgery, mechanization, and construction.3 Materials that
emerge from the field could soon be ubiquitous in worldwide technology,
and scientists promise further advances.4
Against this promising background, it is easy to overlook the dangers that
nanotechnology presents.
Nanoparticles interact unpredictably and
unprecedentedly with the human body.5 Nanorobots may soon possess the
ability to create new nanorobots or even to replicate themselves many times
over.6
These technologies, if managed negligently, could lead to catastrophic
accidents. If intentionally weaponized, they could represent a paradigm shift
in warfare. Because of its difficulty to trace, its unpredictability, its capacity
for grave biological harm, its potential ability to infiltrate technological
systems, and its possible ability to self-replicate in the future,
nanotechnology could contribute to devastating new weapons.7 These
weapons could contribute to massive human rights violations, both because
of the numbers of people they could endanger and the horrific types of
damage they could inflict.8
The international community needs an effective deterrent to both
governments and individual actors that seek to weaponize nanotechnology.
It also needs a reliable system for prosecuting these crimes in the future and
a cognizable set of crimes that accurately captures the potential harms of
weaponized nanotechnology.
1
Wei Zhou, Ethics of Nanobiotechnology at the Frontline, 19 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 481, 482 (2003).
2
Id.
3
Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., Nanotechnology Overview, ADVANCED MATERIALS & PROCESSES,
May 2000, at 48.
4
Id.
5
See Hitoshi Nasu & Thomas Faunce, Nanotechnology and the International Law of
Weaponry: Towards International Regulation of Nano-Weapons, 20 J.L. INF. & SCI. 21, 27
(2010) (describing the difficulty in treating physical injuries sustained as the result of
nanoparticles because of their unpredictability).
6
Vasily E. Tarasov, Quantum Nanotechnology, 8 INT’L J. NANOSCIENCE 337, 337 (2009).
7
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5.
8
See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the biological effects of weaponization).
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The International Criminal Court (ICC) already has procedures for
addressing the sorts of crimes that these technologies could enable. Rather
than developing a new framework and yet another regulatory body to govern
the technology, the ICC could fold nanotechnology crimes into the existing
provisions of the Rome Statute. Specifically, the crime of aggression should
contain language that addresses nanotechnology. These provisions should be
capable of addressing both state-sanctioned military development and
individual deployment of this weapon technology. The adoption of such
provisions would speak to a global consensus that the international
community will not tolerate the misuse of nanotechnology.
II. BACKGROUND
A. What is Nanotechnology?
1. The Technology Itself
In 1959, Richard Feynman presented a speech entitled There’s Plenty of
Room at the Bottom: An Invitation to Enter a New World of Physics.9 In it,
he posed a question to the audience: “Why cannot we write the entire 24
volumes of the Encyclopedia [Britannica] on the head of a pin?”10 He asked
the question to stimulate the crowd’s imagination and to demonstrate that
physics was not thinking small enough.11 Feynman stated that someday in
the future, scientists would be able to build structures a single atom at a time,
affording scientists a greater degree of control over the structures produced
than ever before.12 He proposed that this new technology would have
applications across scientific fields, and in particular, he singled out biology
as a beneficiary of the ability to enhance structures on the atomic level.13 He
even articulated primitive versions of techniques that scientists use today.14
Though Feynman had never heard the word “nanotechnology,” and indeed,

9

Richard Feynman, There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom: An Invitation to Enter a New
World of Physics (Dec. 29, 1959), in 23:5 CALTECH ENGINEERING AND SCI. 22, 22 (Feb. 1960),
available at http://www.calteches.library.caltech.edu/47/2/1960Bottom.pdf.
10
Id.
11
Luca Escoffier, A Brief Review of Nanotechnology Funding and Patenting in Japan, 4
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 101, 102 (2007).
12
Feynman, supra note 9, at 34.
13
See id. at 24 (citing better electron microscopes developed through nanotechnology as
aiding the field of biology).
14
Id. (“Why can’t we manufacture these small computers somewhat like we manufacture
the big ones? Why can’t we drill holes, cut things, solder things, stamp things out, mold
different shapes all at an infinitesimal level?”).
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the term itself had yet to be coined, he was effectively describing the
nanotechnology revolution.
Nanotechnology’s definition is amorphous. Some scholars define it as
research involving the manipulation of structures that takes place on the scale
of one or several nanometers.15 This definition is scientifically unusual
because areas of interest define scientific branches rather than artificiallydenoted scales of focus.16
An alternative definition of nanotechnology is “the investigation of novel
properties that manifest themselves at [nanometer] scale, and of the ability to
manipulate and artificially construct structures at that scale.”17 Regardless of
preferred definitional characteristics, nanotechnology offers the ability to
manipulate individual atoms to effectuate more complex and efficient
structures than otherwise possible.18
Nanotechnology can be approached “top-down” or “bottom-up.”19 In a
top-down approach, scientists seek to whittle down at a macro-sized structure
until all that is left is an atomic arrangement.20 In the bottom-up approach,
however, scientists actually create conditions that induce atoms to form
desired structures of their own volition.21
Carbon nanotubes provide an example of such a bottom-up process.
Scientists fire lasers at a graphite pellet, releasing an intense stream of atoms.
They subject this stream to an array of hot and cold gases calculated to
induce the atoms into hexagonal shapes; the resulting “tubes” are
exceptionally strong and light.22
2. Growth of Nanotechnology
The field of nanotechnology is growing worldwide at a staggering rate.
Global funding topped $4 billion in 2005 and has since increased.23
Militaries are avidly researching nanotechnology; the United States, the
United Kingdom, Sweden, Russia, and India are all turning to
nanotechnology as a potentially useful area of combat research.24 The
15

Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3. A nanometer is one-billionth of a meter.
Id.
17
Ronald N. Kostoff, Raymond G. Koytcheff & Clifford G.Y. Lau, Global Nanotechnology
Research Literature Overview, 74 TECHNOLOGICAL FORECASTING & SOC. CHANGE 1733, 1734
(2007).
18
Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3.
19
Escoffier, supra note 11, at 102.
20
Id.
21
Id.
22
Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3.
23
Escoffier, supra note 11, at 102.
24
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 23.
16
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United States military alone spent almost $400 million in 2010 on
nanotechnology.25 In the private sphere, the United States has issued over
4,400 patents for nanotechnology-related innovations.26
B. Positive Applications
In the minds of many academics, nanotechnology’s promise is nearly
limitless. Fields that are frequently mentioned as beneficiaries of the
technology include medicine and mechanical engineering.
Medical
applications include drug delivery systems and microsurgery.27
Nanoparticles could be engineered to enter the body and bloodstream more
effectively in order to more quickly and completely administer
pharmaceuticals.28
The prospect of microscopic nanorobots, capable of both self-replication
and self-guidance, offers new opportunities for microsurgery. Such devices
could even theoretically be delivered via viruses.29
“Regenerative
medicine”30 is another eventual microsurgical promise, with nano-robots
capable of tissue regeneration and engineering able to target microscopic
flaws in damaged tissue and repair it to a degree modern surgery cannot.31
Nanotechnology also promises significant improvements in electronics
and mechanical engineering. In the United States, medical nanotechnology
patent grants are declining as a proportion of total patents granted, while the
percentage of electronic nanotechnology patents has increased
dramatically.32 Applications include the creation of new fuel cells in which
nano-structures efficiently regulate proton exchange across cells, thereby
avoiding the energy loss usually associated with the exchange.33 Carbon
nanotubes, noted for their toughness and lightness, could have an immediate

25

Id. at 25.
Blaise Mouttet, Nanotechnology and U.S. Patents: A Statistical Analysis, 3
NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 309, 310 (2006).
27
Zhou, supra note 1, at 481; see also Nikhil Mali et al., Carbon Nanotubes as Carriers for
Delivery of Bioactive and Theraputic Agents: An Overview, 3 INT’L J. PHARMACY &
PHARMACEUTICAL SCI. 1 (2011) (discussing modifications that would allow carbon nanotubes
to move through cell walls to deliver pharmaceuticals).
28
Zhou, supra note 1, at 484.
29
Id. at 485.
30
Escoffier, supra note 11, at 103.
31
Zhou, supra note 1, at 483.
32
Mouttet, supra note 26, at 312.
33
Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3.
26
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impact on dozens of manufacturing industries,34 a significant prospect
considering the increasing application of current products like carbon fiber.35
C. Weaponization and Potential Drawbacks
For all the potential benefits of nanotech, its power presents significant
risks. Hitoshi Nasu and Robert Pinson have pointed out the potentially
catastrophic damage that nanotechnology could do if negligently
mismanaged or intentionally weaponized.36 The lack of an international
regulatory structure compounds the risk of an unintentional catastrophe.37
Furthermore, no defined framework exists for punishing either state or
individual actors who intentionally misuse nanotech. The lack of a coherent
strategy for punishment will present increasing problems as scientific
advances increase nanotech’s potential abilities.38
1. Biological Effects of Weaponization
The effects of a weapon engineered using actual nanotechnology could be
catastrophic.39 Indeed, the effects of available proto-nanotechnology are
already severe.40
For example, the Israeli army has developed and deployed the Dense Inert
Metal Explosive (DIME), an explosive device that scatters microparticles of
shrapnel at intense heat and speed.41 Microparticles, precursors to
nanotechnology, have made these weapons possible because weapons
designers can better control the shrapnel that such devices emit, and that
shrapnel is increasingly deadly.42 The result of this proto-nano-weapon
34

Id.
Stephen Trimble, Lockheed Martin Reveals F-35 to Feature Nanocomposite Structures,
FLIGHTGLOBAL (May 26, 2011), http://www.flightglobal.com/news/articles/lockheed-martin-rev
eals-f-35-to-feature-nanocomposite-357223 (describing Lockheed Martin’s consideration of the
replacement of over 100 components of F-35 fighter aircraft with a “thermoset epoxy reinforced
by carbon nanotubes”); Carbon Fiber Racing Car Parts, RIVERS CARBON, http://www.riverscar
bon.com/carbon-fiber-race-car-parts (last visited Jan. 11, 2012) (describing advances in carbon
fiber production and resulting increases in joint accuracy within cars); Ann M. Thayer, Carbon
Nanotubes by the Metric Ton, 85 CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS 29 (Nov. 12, 2007), available
at http://pubs.acs.org/email/cen/html/112207102848.html (describing the increasing use of
carbon nanotubes in commercial industries and projecting future commercial uses of such tubes).
36
See generally infra Section II.C.1–3 (discussing weaponization and potential drawbacks).
37
See generally infra Section II.C.1–3 (discussing weaponization and potential drawbacks).
38
See generally Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5.
39
Robert D. Pinson, Is Nanotechnology Prohibited By the Biological and Chemical
Weapons Conventions?, 22 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 279, 281 (2004).
40
See id. at 280–81.
41
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 22.
42
Id.
35
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reveals the dangers of future weapons—the microparticles of shrapnel are
nearly impossible for doctors to remove from the target of the weapon
because there is nothing for them to essentially grab on to.43
The prospect of a DIME-style weapon that incorporates nanoparticles
becomes more terrifying with the emergence of research as to the effects of
these nanoparticles on biological systems. Even carbon nanotubes, which
are designed for inherently peaceful, industrial purposes, are biologically
devastating.44 Studies have shown that they become lodged in the lungs and
are nearly impossible for the body to break down because of their unique
structure and tiny size.45 The particles can eventually cause suffocation.46
A device that forces shrapnel into the skin, like the DIME device, would
not be necessary to effectively weaponize nanoparticles because these
particles can be inhaled.47 Once they enter the bloodstream, they are
theoretically capable of directly infiltrating the brain.48 The nanoparticles
can use body systems and pathways that typical biological pathogens cannot.
For example, nanoparticles can travel along the olfactory nerves after
inhalation. Even if they are kept out of the bloodstream, they may still be
capable of infiltrating the brain.49
The ease with which nanoparticles can enter the body, the bloodstream,
and the brain is made worse by the difficulties encountered in treating their
effects. Nanoparticles trigger oxidative stress, and “cationic [nanoparticles]
have an immediate toxic effect at the blood-brain barrier.”50 These
immediate and severe consequences are difficult to diagnose in time to
counteract their effects. Nanomaterials can be “more chemically reactive”
than normal particles.51 They have a higher ratio of surface area to total area
because of their small size and the precise structures to which they are
engineered.52 Nanoparticles actually are so small that their movements and
interactions with surrounding particles are partially governed by the laws of
quantum mechanics, which are inherently unpredictable.53
43

Id.
Pinson, supra note 39, at 280–81.
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
L. James Valverde, Jr. & Igor Linkov, Nanotechnology: Risk Assessment and Risk
Management Perspective, 8 NANOTECHNOLOGY L. & BUS. 25, 26 (2011).
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Masami Matsuda & Geoffrey Hunt, Research on the Societal Impacts of
Nanotechnology: A Preliminary Comparison of USA, Europe and Japan, 19 BIO-MED.
MATERIALS & ENGINEERING 259, 260 (2009).
51
Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 30.
52
Id.
53
Id.; see also Tarasov, supra note 6, at 338 (“The impossibility of ideally copying (or
44
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Nanoparticles vary wildly in their individual reactions to the same stimuli
because of their tiny scale, individual engineering, chemical reactivity, and
subsequent interactivity with the laws of quantum mechanics.54 A necessary
first step for managing a public health crisis is making an accurate
identification of the toxin, pathogen, or other catalyst causing the crisis.55
However, without advance knowledge of the specific nanoparticle in
question, the “immediate toxic effect” that Matsuda and Hunt describe could
devastate a community before officials could react.56
The EPA’s current modeling methods for predicting and containing
environmental crises incorporate “probabilistic modeling” and “predictive
structure-activity analysis.”57
However, the fragmented structure of
nanoparticles and the enormous variability among them makes them resistant
to these very analyses.58 Because such models assume predictable structures
on a molecular level, they cannot account for the altered molecular makeup
of some nanoparticles. If malevolent actors deploy nano-weapons, the
current public health response plan would not be sufficient to combat the
crisis.
Experts in the emergency response field are expressing these concerns
about modern nanoparticles such as carbon nanotubes. As new nanoparticles
are developed, their specialization and complexity will only increase. The
implications for intentional weaponization of these particles are stark, given
their unpredictability.
A DIME-like shrapnel device incorporating
nanoparticles instead of microparticles and intentionally distributing different
kinds of nanoparticles with different chemical reactions could present a
public health nightmare.
2. Difficulty of Controlling Self-replicating Devices
In addition to concerns about the present biological effects of
nanoparticles, the future development of nanotechnology presents another
danger. In 1977, a physicist named K. Eric Drexler proposed that not only
could scientists create and program robots on a nano-scale, but that those
nano-robots could be programmed to construct and train future nano-

cloning) an unknown quantum state is one of the basic rules of quantum mechanics . . . . The
no-cloning theorem tells us that cloning quantum machines cannot work ideally.”).
54
Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 30–31.
55
Id.; WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, MANUAL FOR THE PUBLIC HEALTH MANAGEMENT OF
CHEMICAL INCIDENTS 10 (2009).
56
Matsuda & Hunt, supra note 50, at 260.
57
Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 32.
58
Id. at 31.
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robots.59 These nano-robots capable of fabricating similar machines are
popularly called “assemblers.”60 Pinson notes that these assemblers are
likely years from becoming a reality.61 However, there are already products
utilizing the benefits of nanotechnology, and the informatics, pharmaceutical,
energy, and defense industries are investing heavily in research and
development.62
Replicator nano-robots are the next logical step after assembler nanorobots. Vasily E. Tarasov, a quantum physicist at Moscow State University,
believes that quantum replicating nano-robots are possible and will
eventually be a reality.63 Even outside of the quantum field, experts discuss
replicators as a legitimate possibility.64
The basic theory of replicators is that the nano-robots could not only be
trained to follow orders in the process of creating new nano-robots like
assemblers, but also could actually automatically generate more and more
copies of themselves.65 These replicator nanorobots would theoretically be
able to reproduce at a geometric rate.66 The weaponization of replicator
robots is a frightening thought. Because existing nanoparticles already carry
formidable biological effects, the cascade effect of replicators that can
manipulate nanotech is deeply troubling.
3. State or Individual? How to Punish Dissimilar Actors for Deployment
of Weaponized Nanotechnology
The current dispersal of nanotechnology raises further difficulties in
preventing weaponization: (1) the threat of a non-state actor weaponizing the
technology, and (2) the uncertainty of prosecuting an individual who is either
state-affiliated or legitimately operating as a rogue agent.
Not only are militaries researching the applications of nanotechnology to
warfare, but some of this work is outsourced to universities and companies.
59
Pinson, supra note 39, at 284; see also Rudy Baum, Nanotechnology: Drexler and
Smalley Make the Case for and Against ‘Molecular Assemblers,’ CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING
NEWS, Dec. 1, 2003, at 37 (“My proposal is, and always has been to guide the chemical
synthesis of complex structures by mechanically positioning reactive molecules, not by
manipulating individual atoms. This proposal has been defended successfully again and
again.”).
60
Zhou, supra note 1, at 483.
61
Pinson, supra note 39, at 285.
62
Id. at 285–86.
63
Tarasov, supra note 6, at 338.
64
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 29; Meg McGinity Shannon, Nanotechnology’s Shadow,
48 COMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM 21 (2005) (discussing progression from individual
nanoparticles to assemblers of nanoparticles to “productive nanosystems”).
65
Zhou, supra note 1, at 483.
66
Id.
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For example, the United States military is working with the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology to determine applications of nanotechnology across a
spectrum of uses in warfare.67
Universities are not the only private entities that already have access to
advanced nanotechnology. Corporations and individuals account for over
75% of United States medical nanotechnology patents.68 The numbers are
similar in other major areas of patent grants.69 Nanotechnology is therefore
progressively owned by a more wide-ranging group of people. The
increasing private ownership of the technology creates further avenues
through which a malevolent actor could gain control of nanoscience and
weaponize it—if more corporations, scientists, and universities have the
technical schematics and equipment necessary to create nanoparticles, the
pace of its proliferation will likely increase.
III. INEFFECTIVE ALTERNATE MEANS OF REGULATION OR DETERRENCE
Current nanotechnology regulation leaves much to be desired. It is highly
questionable whether existing regulations could prevent rogue leaders, states,
or other groups from deploying either nanoparticles or nano-robots in an
intentionally destructive manner.
A. Current Regulation of Research, Development, and Other Peaceful Uses
Current regulation is almost entirely national in nature, rather than
international.70 Such regimes might incentivize responsible development of
nanotechnology among corporate or research-based actors, because some
regulatory frameworks on the national level do provide for penalties for
malfeasance.71 However, if the concern is malfeasance by a nation, or an
actor with enough influence on a national level to enjoy de facto control,
then regulations on the national level would prove ineffective. What
67
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 26. MIT and the U.S. military collaborate through the
Institute for Soldier Nanotechnologies and are researching nanotechnology’s relevance to
“protection; injury intervention and cure; and human performance improvement.” Id.
68
Mouttet, supra note 26, at 314.
69
Id.
70
Diana M. Bowman & Graeme A. Hodge, A Small Matter of Regulation: An International
Review of Nanotechnology Regulation, 8 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 1 (2006); Rick
DelVecchio, Berkeley Considering Need for Nano Safety, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 24, 2006, at A1
(detailing a proposed local Berkeley regulation that would limit the production of
nanomaterials until they could be more adequately studied. The town did not feel that even
American regulations as the national level were protecting them sufficiently from industrial
interests.).
71
Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70, at 30.
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international guidelines that do exist are exactly that—guidelines.72 These
guidelines offer prescriptive goals for what an ideal future of nanotechnology
would look like.73 However, they do not have the regulatory muscle or the
threat of real sanctions so they do not truly shape the evolution of the
technology or convince actors to alter their behavior in its deployment.74
On the national level, regulations that offer any meaningful guidance to
nanotechnology innovators do not always recognize nanotechnology as a
new field with unique challenges. As noted earlier, nanoparticles are
fundamentally unstable because of their size.75 They behave in ways that
similar chemicals do not because unpredictable principles of quantum
mechanics dictate how these particles move and interact with the
environment around them.76
Case studies show that nations do not appreciate these distinctively
unpredictable qualities.77 For example, the current chemical regulatory
scheme in the United Kingdom is tasked with governing nanotechnology but
remains fundamentally chemical in nature.78 These regulations address
chemicals of the same type equally, even if one of these chemicals has a
unique nanostructure and could behave unpredictably.79 Laws in Australia,
Japan, and the United States compound these problems; chemical regulations
focus on “new chemicals.”80 Many novel nanoparticles are not defined as
“new chemicals,” and so the existing chemical regulations tasked with
controlling them do not govern them nor have any jurisdiction over their
deployment.81
Nations seem unwilling to acknowledge the severe
deficiencies in their regulatory frameworks. For example, the United States’
various regulatory agencies have made it clear that they do not believe that
nano-specific regulations are necessary.82 This belief may be based on an
unwillingness or inability to delve into the scientific complexity inherent to
nanotechnology.83
Most regulations aim to prevent the misuse of non-reproductive
nanoparticles and do not address the threat of self-replicating or self72

Id. at 45.
Id.
74
Id.
75
Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 30.
76
Id.
77
See Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70 (discussing bureaucratic unwillingness to confront
differences between nanotechnology and conventional chemicals).
78
Id. at 17.
79
Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 31.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70, at 19.
83
Valverde & Linkov, supra note 47, at 34.
73
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assembling nanorobots.84 Although these technologies are not yet available,
their very nature would make the current chemical-based regulatory structure
obsolete because they share traits like self-replication with biological agents
rather than chemical ones. Even for peaceful technology created in good
faith, current regulation is insufficient and misguided.
B. Inadequate Alternate Theories for Regulating Weaponized
Nanotechnology
Regulating nanoparticles as biologically lethal agents presents one of the
first potential opportunities to bring nanotechnology under the general
purview of weaponry and warfare-based treaties. Redefining popular
conception of nanoparticles from mechanical technology to a biological-style
agent would give international groups a coherent reason to impose strong
international regulations. It would also entail an acknowledgement that the
technology can be used for intentional destruction. Much of the current state
of regulation seems to focus on preventing accidents in the development of
otherwise well-intentioned products.85 Viewing nanotechnology in the same
light as biological weapons would also give a framework for punishing
intentionally-created nanoweapons.
However, regulating these nanoparticles and nanorobots as biological
entities also presents challenges. Robert Pinson points out many of the
difficulties that would emerge from such a regulatory regime. He theorizes
that the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) might have standing to
govern nanotechnology.86 The United States, United Kingdom, and U.S.S.R.
ratified the BWC in 1972.87 It bans the development or deployment of
biological agents for weaponry, and crucially for nanotechnology
governance, prohibits toxins, “regardless of their properties.”88 The
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which went into effect in April
1997, also prohibits the deployment of “toxic chemicals and their
84
See Oak Ridge Nat’l Lab., supra note 3 (discussing current nanotechnology research);
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5 (discussing current failure to adequately regulate nanoparticulate
weapons and exposing the lack of forward-thinking nanotechnology governance); Bowman &
Hodge, supra note 70, at 31 (discussing regulations that address only nanoparticles and do not
even acknowledge them as chemically unique).
85
See Bowman & Hodge, supra note 70, at 31 (explaining that nanotechnology currently
falls under chemical regulatory regimes that govern industrial business, as “the
commercialisation of products containing manufactured nano-particles continues to escalate”).
86
See Pinson, supra note 39 (pointing out the physical similarities between the adverse
effects of inhaled or ingested nanoparticles and those of more traditional weaponized
biological agents that the BWC clearly has jurisdiction to regulate).
87
Id. at 291.
88
Id. at 293.
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precursors.”89 Given the consequences that nanoparticles, such as carbon
nanotubes, can impose on human physiology, they might conceivably be
brought under the purview of the Convention.
Nanotechnology varies so greatly in its applications and effects that it
may not fit within the definitions in the Biological and Chemical Weapons
Conventions.90 The drafters of the BWC and CWC intentionally kept the
definition of “toxin” vague so that new technologies would not be excluded
from regulation.91 The current evolutionary path of nanotechnology,
however, may become so divergent that it could no longer qualify as a
toxin.92 The BWC also prohibits more conventional, pathogen-based
weaponry. It is questionable, however, if the BWC covers even replicator
nanorobots, because it requires that the regulated quantity be “alive.”93 Manmade robots probably would not enter BWC jurisdiction, even if they
behaved similarly to traditional pathogens.94
Indeed, modern regulatory frameworks are likely insufficient to deal with
any intentional deployment of nanotechnology in a wartime setting. The
field of nanotechnology could produce weapons that “span several traditional
technological compartments and blur the distinction between conventional
weapons and weapons of mass destruction.”95 The kind of biological
dangers mentioned earlier are merely one example of this blurred line—the
idea of self-replicating robots would theoretically allow a relatively small
weapon to affect a disproportionately large area. Other weapons, with the
exception of prohibited biological agents, are not noted for reproducing
themselves after their deployment.96 Not only does this ability to reproduce
and continue causing damage distinguish nanorobots from traditional
weapons, it distinguishes them from nuclear and chemical weapons as well.
The current substitute for a true international framework regulates
nanotechnology from the edges rather than addressing it head-on. There is
89

Id. at 294.
Id. at 298.
91
Id. at 292.
92
Id.
93
Id. at 298.
94
Id.
95
Nasu & Faunce, supra note 5, at 29.
96
See generally Nuclear Weapons: How They Work, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS,
(Apr. 2010), http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/nuclear_weapons/
technical_issues/nuclear-weapons-how-they.html (“Essentially, the destructive energy
produced by such weapons is the result of three separate but nearly simultaneous
explosions.”); Emergency Preparedness and Response: Facts About Sarin, CENTERS FOR
DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION (Feb. 2006), http://www.bt.cdc.gov/agent/sarin/basics/fa
cts.asp (explaining that one major chemical weapon, sarin, is very unstable and does not
persist long in the environment once released: “Because it evaporates so quickly, sarin
presents an immediate but short-lived threat.”).
90
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no current international treaty that regulates weaponized nanotechnology.97
The most applicable current regulations ban or present guidelines on general
technologies or delivery vehicles such as “expanding bullets, asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases, biological weapons, chemical weapons, blinding
laser weapons, anti-personnel mines, and most recently, cluster munitions.”98
While these bans may remove some nanotechnology from the battlefield, the
prevention will be incomplete. Some nanotechnology could be used to
produce or augment these weapons, and even directly weaponized
nanorobots or nanoparticles could be delivered via delivery vehicles that
violate treaties.99 However, nanotechnology is evolving into a field
increasingly distinct from the sciences that influence traditional weapons
production.100 Because of this divergence, regulations on current weapons
technologies likely will not accurately encompass future weaponized
nanotechnology.
Pre-emptively developing a comprehensive international approach to
intentionally weaponized nanotechnology is important because the
technology’s deployment would likely be deliberately calculated to inflict
maximum damage. An industrial accident, on the other hand, might be
limited and would likely fall within the scope of a nation’s individual
regulations.101 Some scholars believe that even in the private research realm,
significant regulations will not be enacted until there is a disaster to prompt
them.102 These scholars believe that such a disaster and the resulting
regulation are probably “inevitable,”103 but have publically resigned
themselves to that inevitability. However, the “luxury” of waiting for an
industrial accident does not exist in the wartime context.
The amorphous nature of nanotechnology presents problems even beyond
the classification of weapons as conventional or weapons of mass
destruction. One of the most prominent of these concerns is the ability of
nanotechnology to alter body chemistry.104 Nasu speculates that nanomedicine may be used on a country’s own soldiers in a future war to enhance
their physical capabilities, but with significant long-term harm to the
97
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soldiers.105 A regulatory regime must therefore encompass not only the acts
of a rogue actor with access to nanotechnology and those of a state deploying
nanotechnology against enemy combatants, but also those of a state turning
these technologies on its own citizens.
Current regimes of common law within the international community also
will be insufficient to address concerns of evolving nanotechnology. These
definitions largely center on the differences between the intent behind
actions and the consequences of those same actions.106 In the case of some
nanotechnology, this chasm could be far wider than with any other kind of
weapons technology.107
Further statutes hinge on the definition of
“suffering,” which retains an amorphous definition in international law.108
Beyond this amorphous definition, there is uncertainty as to whether
weaponized nanotechnology would cause “unnecessary” and “superfluous”
damage. If the damage were defined as such, then international common law
would be implicated, but otherwise, there would be little recourse within the
international common law.109
Finally, preemptively shutting off the spigot of nanotechnology-based
weapons may be nearly impossible without the catastrophe that Bowman &
Hodge allude to110 because nations will be unwilling to submit to
nanotechnology regulations that preemptively deter weapons development.111
The proscriptive measures currently available do not sufficiently deter states
from weapon development given the powerful financial incentives favoring
weapon development;112 asking states to submit to pre-emptive checks of
nascent technology with great economic potential is quixotic at best.113
C. Ineffectiveness of Purely National Solutions
The international nature of nanotechnology development presents unique
problems for avoiding its weaponization. As previously mentioned, at least
105
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five militaries are aggressively pursuing nanotechnological advantages.114
Thus, a single country’s regulation or goodwill can prevent the misuse of the
technology. Countries also have different ideas of what constitutes proper
regulation of science;115 therefore, there may be different cultural ideas of
how far weapons research could ethically proceed.
If the international community waits to enact these enforcements until
nanotechnology is deployed in an international conflict, the consequences
may be far worse for two reasons. First, the technology has shown enough
destructive potential that an intentionally combative use of it could easily
exceed the consequences of an industrial accident.116 Second, it would be
difficult to regulate this technology during an actual conflict because of the
incentives of war and the uncertainties of classifying nanotechnology.
Warfare naturally pits state actors against each other. Because nations at war
are fighting for their own survival in a zero-sum game, Bowman and
Hodge’s proposed regulations on the national level are unlikely to
succeed.117 If a nation can gain a competitive advantage by suspending its
own national policies, there may be an incentive to do so. As for the current
international regulations that govern delivery vehicles and present
technologies, nanotechnology is becoming increasingly difficult to define
because of its unique properties.118 A coherent international voice would
clarify the acceptability of these new technologies. For example, there is
currently debate about whether the DIME system that Israel recently
deployed against the Palestinians violates international weapons treaties
because it bears some similarities to banned chemical weapons; however,
there is no body to issue a definitive international ruling on the subject.119
114
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Non-military research can also carry military implications. Japan is one
of the largest researchers of nanotechnology in the world; lagging behind the
United States in patents granted but leading in patents applications.120 Japan
has identified nanotechnology as an area of research focus and has invested
the equivalent of several hundred million dollars in development as part of
its Second Science and Technology Basic Plan.121 Japan significantly lags
behind other nations, including the United States, in the perception that the
ethical issues surrounding nanotechnology are worthy of research and
funding.122 This lack of concern mirrors other casual attitudes towards safety
in the Japanese research community; for example, the nation trails the United
States in bioethics as a field.123 That casual attitude is particularly troubling
because scientists have already identified specific biological risks from
current nanotechnology.124
It is also generally troubling, because
nanotechnology is an increasingly powerful force and the world does not
have a coherent or cohesive attitude towards its dangers and regulation.
IV. ANALYSIS
Because of the current state of regulation, it will be necessary to articulate
and implement structures for regulating nanotechnology as a weapon and not
just as a new research technology. Current weapons regulations are at best
inadequate and contain too many contradictions and ambiguities to function
effectively. The International Criminal Court (ICC), while imperfect, is
currently the best solution for such regulation. The ICC already exists and
would not require the adoption of a new set of international treaties. Its
charter seeks to prevent acts of large-scale destruction and crimes against
humanity. This large-scale frame of reference is appropriate because one of
the more serious effects of weaponized biotech could be biological
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warfare.125 Additionally, the ICC can target both elected state actors and
private but prominent actors within states for their crimes.
A. The International Criminal Court
The ICC is an international body designed to punish “serious crimes of
concern to the international community.”126 The Court was established in
response to the African and Yugoslavian atrocities in the 1990s, after
international consensus that a permanent body was necessary.127 The signers
of the Rome Statute, which established the Court, believed that it should be
an independent court based on an international treaty.128 Though the crimes
of the mid-1990s were the crucial catalyst for the ICC’s formation, the
Nuremberg and Tokyo trials are also considered predecessors to the Court,
and they addressed many of the same issues that the ICC faces today.129
The ICC prosecutes large-scale crimes, the main causes of action being
genocide, crimes against humanity, aggression, and war crimes.130 Scholars
fear weaponized nanotechnology because in several years or decades, it
could cause catastrophic damage that currently only weapons of mass
destruction can.131 Because these crimes could threaten broad populations,132
they fit within the general scope of ICC prosecutions. After prosecuting
African genocides,133 the ICC would likely have more gravitas and
institutional capability to deal with crimes of the magnitude that weaponized
nanotechnology could facilitate.
The most straightforward path by which the ICC could prosecute
weaponized nanotechnology is by incorporating the technology into its
125
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definition of the crime of aggression. Article 5 of the Rome Treaty
recognizes a crime of aggression as one of the four major crimes that the ICC
should prosecute.134 However, the crime is not currently under the effective
jurisdiction of the ICC.135 The Rome Treaty delayed including an official
definition, opting instead to incorporate the crime later.136 The Treaty did
not establish an official definition of the crime of aggression in time to
incorporate it into the established war crimes, genocide, and crimes against
humanity jurisdictions that were already codified within.137
The Special Working Group on the Crime of Aggression was formed to
define the crime of aggression.138 This group’s task is to define the crime of
aggression.139 They are still refining these definitions and will not have an
enforceable definition until 2017.140 Because this definition is still being
refined and modified, it could incorporate emerging areas of public policy
without challenging the legitimacy of the Rome Treaty. It is therefore ideal
for addressing nanotechnology-specific difficulties.141
The first article in their working proposition states that
For the purpose of this Statute, “crime of aggression” means
the planning, preparation, initiation or execution, by a person in
a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the
political or military action of a State, of an act of aggression
which, by its character, gravity and scale, constitutes a manifest
violation of the Charter of the United Nations.142
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The rest of the recommendation attempts to define the crime of
aggression in more specific terms.143 These terms seem almost universally to
apply to the movement of land-based or naval-based armies against a rival
state power.144 The recommendations (though current) spend little time
addressing or considering the implications of modern technological power
and its destructive effect on the broad-based civilian structures within
societies.145 The Working Group’s recommendations seem keyed towards
re-fighting the wars of the early twentieth century—they explicitly prohibit
many uses of overt land warfare while ignoring current projection of
nonconventional force.146
The crime of aggression’s current definition omits language that could
regulate nanotechnology. First, the ICC’s promise is that it can potentially
offer prosecutions against both official state actions and de facto state actions
(or those undertaken by powerful interests within a country that still do not
technically possess state power).147 The current draft of the crime of
aggression “distinguishes between the ‘act of aggression’ (what a state does)
and the ‘crime of aggression’ (what a leader does).”148 This gap addresses
the difference between an actual national act of aggression against another
state and the planning, initiation, and execution of such an act by the
country’s political leadership.149 This gap in prosecutorial authority could
severely hinder any number of decentralized crimes. Ophardt addresses the
potential jurisdictional gap in terms of cyber warfare, but the gap applies
equally to nanotechnology governance. Fundamentally, the current ICC
theories on aggression rely on “traditional concepts of territorial integrity.”150
While this current definition might be insufficient, the regulation of
aggression might prove more useful than initially imagined.
The apparent leadership gap in the ICC definitions of aggression could
also cut in favor of some forms of nanotechnology regulation. Aggression is
a “leadership” crime,151 and charges can be brought not only against actual
political leaders, but also those in a position to induce or influence significant
policy changes within a state.152 It is therefore more likely that influential
scientists and technicians could be held to account for their influence in the
143
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development of nanoweapons.153 This flexibility of the Court could also help
weak governments confront private developers of military nanotechnology
within their borders. The ICC can either pursue cases proprio motu or based
on a “referral from any State Party.”154
In addition, the crime of aggression could include a provision for
attempted aggression, even though some scholars currently see this as
unlikely.155 Article 25 of the Rome Treaty contains the general attempt
provision, and there was argument as to whether it should apply in the case
of state aggression.156 Attempted aggression may allow for preemptive
regulations against weaponized nanotech. The ICC generally has jurisdiction
over attempted crimes if other jurisdictional requirements are met; it is not
completely clear from the Special Working Group’s drafting process whether
the ability to prosecute for the crime of aggression would fall within the
attempt framework.157 While Clark hypothesizes that obvious cases of
attempt would be justiciable under the ICC, it is possible that the regulations
on attempt would curtail the research activities of weapons scientists.
Further avenues of attack against nontraditional actors are enumerated
throughout ICC regulations. For example, there is a regulation against
“[a]llowing an attack by a State to originate from its sovereign territory,”
which “is also considered an act of aggression.”158 Ophardt speculates that
the breadth of this definition could allow the ICC flexibility in legitimately
prosecuting nations that harbor non-state groups within their borders and
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allow them to develop weaponized nanotechnology.159 The functional
predecessors of the ICC160 also zealously prosecuted non-state actors for
their complicity in human rights violations; the Nuremburg prosecutions
included actions against those who financed the Nazi regime on the theory
that their actions had enabled the atrocities that followed.161
The International Criminal Court’s charter allows for prosecutions against
states that commit crimes of aggression or leaders that commit crimes against
humanity.162 It contains multiple other avenues for theoretically attacking
unorthodox and technically advanced crimes that can originate from either
state or non-state impetuses.163 And, it is an established body that actually
has the mechanisms to try cases.164 Other proposals for the creation of new
bodies to regulate only nanotechnology do not acknowledge these realities.165
The risks from intentionally weaponized nanotechnology are too great and
too pressing to entrust to radically new legal provisions that are untested.
V. CONCLUSION
Nanotechnology promises rapid advancement to many areas of science.
In the next decades, it may dramatically improve surgical techniques,
durability of goods, and industrial processes.166 There are many reasons to
embrace the development of the technology. However, the unknowns
surrounding nanotechnology affirm that the embrace should be cautious.
Nanoparticles can have unpredictable and adverse effects on organisms,167
and nanorobots could deal a crippling blow to a nation or business’s
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technology infrastructure if they achieve the ability to replicate
themselves.168
Current methods of punishing the intentional misuse of nanotechnology
are inadequate. The common law includes elements for war crimes that do
not apply to nanotechnology.169 Nanoparticles do not closely enough
resemble biological or chemical agents to fall under the Biological Weapons
Convention or the Chemical Weapons Convention.170 Current international
treaties regarding delivery vehicles and other traditional weapons will not
capture the future evolution of nanotech.171 And nations cannot be relied
upon to regulate their own military technology in a time of war.
The International Criminal Court already exists.172 It has prosecutors, and
it has a defined power structure.173 The ICC has prosecuted crimes across
the globe,174 so its reach is not in question. The ICC is designed to account
for actions that affect broad swaths of people175 like researchers speculate an
advanced nanoweapon would.176 Finally, the Special Working Group is still
defining the crime of aggression,177 so definitions specifically condemning
the evils of weaponized nanotech could be plugged relatively seamlessly into
the broad Rome Statute framework.
Before the military conflicts of the upcoming years and decades, nations
should unequivocally state that nanotechnology has no place as a weapon.
Its potential effects invoke our deepest fears. Properly weaponized, it could
kill numbers of people that society currently believes only weapons of mass
destruction can.178 The international community should demonstrate the
international criminal consequences that will accompany the deployment of
such a technology. The ICC is the best option for accomplishing such
regulation and deterrence.
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